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A Framework on Consumption Taxes
and Their Impact on International
Trade
The consumption tax is a word often heard when discussing
tax reform; however, few discuss the specific implications of a
consumption tax. Furthermore, it is even more rare to discuss the
international effects of a consumption tax. This comment will
provide a basic framework for the international considerations
and consequences of a consumption tax. In part I, I will provide a
terse definition of a consumption tax followed by part II which
will begin the discussion on the characteristics of a consumption
tax. Many of the examples in parts I and II are given in light of
tax reform proposals in the United States; however, as part IV and
V will show, these characteristics are not limited to the consumption tax in the United States.
In part III, I will provide a short discussion of proponents of
the consumption tax in the United States, and in part IV, I will
demonstrate the properties of both a destination-based consumption tax and an origin-based consumption tax. In reviewing both
types of consumption tax, it is clear that there is a dilemma as to
the effect consumption taxes have on international trade. Some
economists predict that both destination and origin based
consumption taxes have a net neutral effect on international trade.
Other economists and tax analysts believe that the effect is not
neutral. Part V will expand the analysis to four basic models of
nations with competing and/or complimentary consumption based
taxes. The models are then analyzed under interjurisdictional
equity conditions, border control implications, and relocation of
corporation problems. Lastly, section VI will impose the information from the previous analysis onto a model of the European
Union. In conclusion, I will analyze what type of consumption tax
or taxes gives the greatest advantage to the European Union and
whether the tax advantage is permissible under the GAIT.
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The Consumption Tax

A consumption tax is a tax on spending or sales.' This is in
sharp contrast to the current United State's income tax system.
Under the consumption tax, outflows are taxed, while under an
2
income tax, inflows are taxed. In other words, individuals are
taxed by what they take from the economy, i.e. consumption,
whereas under an income tax, individuals are taxed according to
what they produce for the economy.' Another crucial characteristic of a consumption tax is that it removes all investment
spending from the tax base.4

Consumption taxes come in many forms. A pure cash-flow
expenditure tax, also known as a consumed income tax, applies a
tax rate to total income minus saving.5 Usually the cash-flow
expenditure tax is levied directly' upon the individual and
reported by the individual. Another form is the retail sales tax.
This type of consumption tax is levied on the sales of goods and
services.7 In practice, the retail sales tax is indirect because it is
collected by the seller of the goods or services. Currently, many
states have enacted this type of consumption tax. Between the
extremes of both the cash-flow expenditure tax and the retail sales
tax, is the third form of consumption tax, the VAT, or value-added
tax.9 A VAT is levied on goods and services at each stage of
production through the retail level; and is collected from the
seller.' ° A final example of a consumption tax is the flat tax.
Under the flat tax, businesses pay taxes on their total sales
revenue less the costs of material inputs," including wages and

1.
(1995).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
pay it.

Robert E. Hall & Alvin Rabushka, The Flat Tax, TAX NOTES 1, 18
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hall & Rabushka, supra note 1.
A "direct tax" is a tax demanded from the individual who is intended to

JAMES J. FREEELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS
TAXATION 15 (1998).

OF FEDERAL INCOME

7. Hall & Rabushka, supra note 1.
8. An Aindirect tax" is paid by a person, usually the seller, who can shift the
burden of a tax. JAMES J. FREEELAND ET AL., supra note 6.
9. Hall & Rabushka, supra note 1.
10. Id..
11. The costs of labor, materials, and other inputs purchased in the United
States or imported to the United States would be allowable.. .as deductions for
the business tax. Id. at 32.
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investment goods.'2 This is different from the VAT tax in that the
VAT does not allow deduction for wages and salaries.
II.

Characteristics of a Consumption Tax

The consumption tax has been deemed by its proponents as
the cure for the federal income tax. Indeed, the consumption tax
has many benefits. The cornerstone of a democratic and comprehensive tax is application of the same rate of tax to all similarly
situated individuals. 14 The current income tax has many opportunities for those earning the same amount to be treated
differently. For example, the income tax may impose different tax
liabilities on taxpayers with the same economic income depending
on the source of that income." In addition, the federal income tax
system treats expenditures differently depending on their
purpose. 6 In contrast, the consumption tax applies one rate to all
expenditures.
It is important to note that a consumption tax of any type can
become complex, if its structure is altered. 8 For example, with
political pressure, the flat tax could be changed to a multi-rate
system.' 9 Though no longer a strict flat consumption tax, the
multi-rate level would be more fair but more complicated.20 The
VAT tax can also succumb to complications like those under the
European VAT tax model which features numerous exemptions
and multiple rates. 21 If the consumption tax retains its simplicity,
another benefit is its ability to prevent tax avoidance. The federal
income tax avails savvy taxpayers the opportunity to escape tax.
The consumption tax would treat everyone more equally. 2
The consumption tax might reflect a more accurate
indication of an individual's ability to pay because consumption is

12. Susan Wieler, Consumption Taxes: Do They Spur Growth?, 41
CHALLENGE 1, 5 (1998).

13. "The flat tax removes wages and salaries from the business VAT and
taxes them at the individual level instead." Id.
14. Deloitte & Touche "Consumption Tax" at http://www.dtonline.com/
TAXREF/trissue.htm#international (last visited October 29, 1999).
15.
16.

17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id.; DANIEL MITCHELL, THE FLAT TAX 11, 17 (1996).

Susan Wieler, supra note 12, at 4.
Deloitte & Touche, supra note 14.

20.

Id.

21.
22.

Susan Wieler, supra note 12.
Deloitte & Touche, supra note 14.
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less variable over time than income. " To demonstrate this idea
economists point to an individual's ability to borrow and lend
money when the individual wants. 24 Thus, the timing of the
receipt of income is not as indicative of the individual's ability to
pay as is the consumption of goods.25
A.

Domestic Investment

One of the largest benefits of a consumption tax is its positive
effect on savings. A country with a large percentage of savings
26
More capital goods, such as
will invest more in capital goods.
better infrastructure, will make workers more productive. The
expected effect is that the economy will be more efficient and
produce more goods. In turn, the standard of living will rise.27
A consumption tax taxes consumption and not savings;
therefore, the consumption tax provides an incentive to save
money for the future. The federal income tax does the opposite; it
penalizes savings in the future. Studies show that nations with a
consumption tax plan save more percentage of their total income
than do people in the United States. 28
Many proponents of the consumption tax set their taxing
rates below that which would be required to achieve the same
revenue under the current income tax.29 The lower rate is based
on the idea that given the chance, the savings incentive will
increase investment and increase the real GDP (gross domestic
product). However, if the savings increase does not materialize,
the result will be a loss of revenue. 30 For example, the Shelby-

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Some economists and tax policy analysts assume that if a consumption
tax is instituted, the resulting change in the capital/labor ratio depends on the
saving elasticity (the response of the individual saving to the interest rate);
however, Laurence S. Seidman and Kenneth A. Lewis disprove this theory by
demonstrating in a one standard life-cycle growth model, that the assumption,
that the capital/labor ration depends on the saving elasticity, is true in the
shortrun but is not true in the long run. That is, the increase in the steady-state
capital/labor ration will increase the same regardless of saving elasticity.
Lawrence S. Seidman & Kenneth A. Lewis, The Consumption Tax and the Saving
Elasticity, NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL, March, 1999, at 67.
27. Susan Wieler, supra note 12.
28. Sam Nunn, The Benefits of Consumption Tax, 31 HARV. J ON LEGISL.
273, 275 (1995); however, savings may also be a function of environment and
culture and may have nothing to do with the federal tax.
29. Susan Wieler, supra note 12, at 6.
30. ALAN J. AUERBACH, Tax Reform, Capital Allocation, Efficiency, and
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Armey flat tax supports a tax rate of 17%."' Most economists
believe that a 17% tax rate would raise about 19% less revenue
than the taxes it would replace.32 As explained above, advocates
of the 17% flat tax expect the tax to stimulate the economy and
increase output to a level that would produce the same revenues
as those under the current system.33 Whether or not the amount
of real GDP will rise to a sufficient level is uncertain. Most
economists predict that output per capita will increase by
approximately 4%, after ten years.34 However, saving and investment are dynamic elements and may not respond, especially in the
short term, as the Shelby-Armey flat tax model predicts."
By definition, the consumption tax removes investment from
the tax base. 36 Many proponents of the consumption tax believe
that the federal income tax double taxes capital gains. 37 This
occurs when income is earned by a business; it is subject to the
corporate income tax." That same income is taxed, a second time,
when it is distributed to shareholders. 39 The abolishment of a
federal income tax abolishes the tax on dividends. Not taxing
dividends makes the decision to invest in stocks more appealing,
thus, investment rises.4n
B. Administrative Efficiency
The federal income tax is extremely inefficient. 4 ' The
inefficiencies of administering the federal income tax allow a large
portion of American tax dollars to be spent on direct compliance
costs (administration costs) and deadweight losses.42 Every dollar
Growth, The Economic Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform 58 quoted in, Susan
Wieler, supra note 12, at 6.
31. DANIEL MITCHELL, THE FLAT TAX 11 (1996).
32. U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, 'New' ArmeyShelby Flat Tax Would Still Lose Money, Treaseury Funds 451-61 quoted in
Susan Wieler, supra note 12, at 6.
33. ALAN J. AUERBACH, Tax Reform, Capital Allocation, Efficiency, and
Growth, The Economic Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform 58 quoted in Susan
Wieler, supra note 12, at 6.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Hall & Rabushka, supra note 1.
37. DANIEL MITCHELL, supra note 32, at 34.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Economic theory holds that savings is equal to investment. CAMPBELL R.
MCCONNNELL & STANLEY L. BRUE, MACROECONOMICS 182 (1993).
41. Hall & Rabushka, supra note 1, at 5.
42. Id.
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spent complying with the federal income tax is a lost benefit to the
American tax payer.
The federal income tax imposes two types of costs.4" The first
is direct compliance costs: record keeping, learning about tax
requirements, etc."
Fifty years ago, the IRS estimated the
compliance burden of individuals at 1.2% of federal tax
revenues. 45 In 1985, in a study conducted by Arthur D. Little, the
estimate rose to a staggering 24.4% of income tax returns which
equals $159 billion.46 More conservative estimates still come in at
$100 billion.4 ' The second type of costs is indirect costs. Examples
of indirect costs include a business that never formed because of
high tax rates or elaborate reporting burdens.4' Another example
of an indirect cost is when a dollar is put into a tax shelter instead
of a productive investment.49 The exact amount of value lost to
indirect costs is difficult to determine; ° however, intuitively, these
costs are a loss to total output.5

III. The Consumption Tax and its Implementors
There has been wide discussion in the Congress regarding tax

reform. Many politicians are turning to consumption based taxes
to achieve their political goals. Bills submitted to Congress that
presented the consumption tax include the Schaefer-TauzinChrysler National Retail Sales Tax ("National Retail Sales
Tax"),5 2 the Nunn-Domenici "Unlimited Savings Account" tax
("USA" tax),53 and the Armey-Shelby "flat tax" ("Flat Tax"). 4

43.
44.
45.
46.
earned
benefit

Id.
Id.
Hall & Rabushka, supra note 1, at 5.
In 1985, 24.4% of tax revenues equaled $159 billion. That is $159 billion
by tax payers and spent by the federal government, not on programs to
the citizenry, but to administer the tax system. Data found in JAMES L.
PAYNE, COSTLY RETURNS (1985) cited in Hall & Rabushka, supra note 1, at 6.
47. Hall & Rabushka, supra note 1, at 7.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. The imprecision of these of indirect costs does not hinder economists
from trying to reduce the cost into actual numbers.
51. Hall & Rabushka, supra note 1, at 8.
52. National Retail Sales Act of 1996, H.R. 3039, 104th Cong. (1996).
53. USA Tax Act of 1995, S. 722, 104th Cong. (1995).
54. Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1995, H.R. 2060, 104th Cong.
(1995); S. 1050, 104th Cong. (1995).
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All proposals are designed to collect the same amount of revenue
as currently received under the federal income tax.55
The characteristics of the tax proposals are varied. The
National Retail Sales Tax proposes a 15% tax on gross payments
for consumption in the United States of any property or service,
no matter if the good or service is produced in the United States
or in a foreign country.56 The tax would be collected by the selling
business.57 The tax on imported goods would be paid by the
consuming purchaser."
The USA tax is described as a "hybrid" consumption tax,
imposed in part on businesses producing added value and in part
on individuals.59 The business tax applies a flat-rate subtractivemethod destination-based VAT.6° The subtractive-method VAT
imposes a tax on the difference between sales and payments for
61
inputs used in production (other than wages) in the period.
Individuals would be subject to a graduated-rate personal
61
consumption tax based upon the level of consumption.
The Flat Tax would impose a single-rate on business and
individual tax bases. 6' Businesses would be taxed on the their
gross receipts calculated as the sale of property or services minus
the cost of business inputs, cash wages and retirement
contributions. 64 Dividends and interest would not be taxed and
payments for compensation would be deductible. 6' Individuals
would be taxed a flat 17% rate on their wages earned in the
United States, retirement contributions and unemployment
compensation. A standard deduction would then be subtracted
67
to yield taxable income.

55. Stephen E. Shay & Victoria P. Summers, Selected InternationalAspects of
fundamental Tax Reform Proposals,51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1029, 1040 (1997).
56. Id.
57. Id.
5& Id.
59. Stephen E. Shay & Victoria P. Summers, Selected InternationalAspects of
fundamental Tax Reform Proposals,51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1029, 1041 (1997).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1036.
62. Id. at 1041.
63. Stephen E. Shay & Victoria P. Summers, Selected InternationalAspects of
fundamental Tax Reform Proposals,51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1029, 1044 (1997).
64. Id. at 1044-5
65. Id. at 1045.
66. Id.
67. Stephen E. Shay & Victoria P. Summers, Selected InternationalAspects of
fundamental Tax Reform Proposals,51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1029, 1045 (1997).
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Not only are politicians interested in the consumption tax but
so are the voters. The internet is bursting with groups intent on
reforming the federal income tax. Those groups advocating a consumption tax include: Americans for Fair Taxation,68 Americans
for Tax Reform, 69 Citizens for Alternative Tax System,7 ° Citizens
for Tax Justice,' and Great American Taxpayer's Revolution."
IV. The Effect of a Consumption Tax on International Trade
Consumption taxes can be classified into two types:
destination based and origination based. A tax based on the
destination consumption tax principle imposes a tax on imports
and provides a tax rebate on exports. 73 Thus, a destination based
tax system exempts consumption of its goods outside of the
country. The rebate for domestic goods at the border is called a
border adjustment.74
In comparison, the origination based
consumption tax principle imposes a tax on goods leaving the
United States while not imposing a tax on foreign imports into the
United States.
Thus, the tax is on all value produced in the
United States no matter where it is consumed. An originationbased tax does not have a border adjustment. The majority of
economists believe that border tax adjustments do not make any
76
difference in the effect of both types of consumption taxes.
68. Americans for Fair Taxation at http://www.fairtax.org/home.html (last
visited Oct. 29, 1999).
69. Americans for Tax Reform, Mission Statement at http://www.atr.org/atr/
atrmission.html (last visited Oct. 29, 1999).
70. Citizens for Alternative Tax System at http://www.cats.org/start.html (last
visited Oct. 29, 1999).
71. Citizens for Tax Justice at http://www.ctjorg/ html/ctjdesc.html (last
visited Oct. 29, 1999).
72. Great American Taxpayers' Revolution at http://www.noirs.com/noirs/
(last visited Oct. 29, 1999).
73. Deloitte & Touche "Consumption Tax" at http://www.dtonline.com/
TAXREF/trissue.htm# international (last visited Oct. 29, 1999).
74. Border tax adjustments are required to free goods from sales tax upon
leaving the exporting nation and to subject them to sales tax upon entering the
taxing nation. Border tax adjustments differ from "border taxes," such as import
duties and export duties, which are imposed only on goods crossing
interjurisdictional frontiers. Sijbren Cnossen, Coordination of Sales Taxes in
Federal Countries and Common Markets, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 741, 742 (1994);
Louis Lyons, Consumption Tax Could Mean Big Changesfor Multinationals,TAX
NOTES 1734, June 24, 1996.

75.

Louis

Lyons,

Consumption Tax

Could Mean Big

Changes for

Multinationals,TAX NOTES 1734, June 24, 1996.

76.

Id.; Lee A. Sheppard, The Consumption Tax: Tax Protectionism, TAX

NOTES 13, 13, 15 (1995).
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Destinationand OriginationBased Consumption Taxes Are
Neutral

Proponents portray the consumption tax as granting the
77
United States the winning hand in the international trade game.
They believe that a consumption tax will promote exports and
discourage imports.7 ' A bias against imports has recently become
an important political plank. Because of voter fear of jobs being
lost to foreign countries, politicians have seized upon this
opportunity to present the consumption tax because it appears to
favor exports.79 However, under scrutiny, the consumption tax
may not promote exports. 80
As stated above consumption taxes may be either destination
or origination based. These two types of taxes must be examined
separately. At first, exports appear to give the nation enacting the
tax an advantage; however, under a destination tax system,
imports and exports may be balanced.8 To demonstrate, the
United States enacts a VAT of 20% on all goods. If a computer
sells for $1,000, a domestically produced computer will be bought
domestically for $1,200.2 A domestically produced and exported
computer will receive a rebate, also known as a border
adjustment, and be sold on the foreign market for $1,000.83 The
foreign produced computer will be imported and taxed the United
State's VAT. Then, the foreign produced computer will be sold in
the United States for $1,200. The foreign produced computer that
remains in the foreign country will be sold at its non-taxed price of
$1,000.'4 Thus, the prices on both sides of the border are
equalized, and the United States export does not have a
competitive price benefit.
An origination tax imposes a tax on goods exiting the United
States
exempting
goodsexamination
entering the shows
United that
States."
Using while
the same
prices foreign
as above,
the

77.
78.
79.

Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.

80. Id.; Deloitte & Touche, The Consumption Tax: Tax Protectionism, TAX
NOrEs 13, 13 (1995).
81. Deloitte & Touche, supra note 14.

82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id.

85. Id.; Louis Lyons, Consumption Tax Could Mean Big Changes for
Multinationals,TAX NOTES, June 24, 1996, at 1734.
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United States computer would sell domestically for $1,200.86

In

the foreign market, the United States computer would sell for
$1,200.87 However, the foreign computer sold in the United States
and in the foreign market will a price of only $1,000 in both
markets.8 These prices demonstrate a weakness for the United
States product in both foreign and domestic markets. As
demonstrated, switching to an origin based system would seem to
disadvantage exports; however, many economists believe that this
effect cannot survive.89 Some economists argue that under both

destination and origination principles, the net effect is zero. 90 This
argument is based upon free floating• exchange
rates.9' If exchange
92
rates between countries are flexible, one or both will adjust so
that the dollar appreciates or devalues. 93 Thus, the net effect is

zero. 94
Economists who believe that destination and origination
consumption taxes are neutral over time find that the net effect is
neutral because currency exchange rates will function to eliminate
any gains that may be received.95 Thus, over time the amount
discounted to present value of net exports is zero.96 In other
words, all foreign trade must be paid for in real dollars. 97

The ability of exchange rates to change in response to a
destination based tax (leaving destination and origination consumption taxes neutral) is demonstrated in the following example.
First, a United States computer company ships 1 million computers for $1,000 each to France.98 The total amount received is $1

86. Deloitte & Touche, supra note 14.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Louis Lyons, supra note 75.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. A fully adjustable exchange rate is a freely floating exchange rate. Freely
floating exchange rates are allowed to fluctuate in the open market in response to
changes in supply and demand. ROGER ET AL., ECONOMICS TODAY 787 (1994).
93. Stephen E. Shay & Victoria P. Summers, supra note 56.
94. Louis Lyons, supra note 75.
95. Lee A. Sheppard, The Consumption Tax: Tax Protectionism, TAX NOTES
13, 13 (1995); Malcolm Gillis et al., Indirect Consumption Taxes: Common Issues
and Differences Among the Alternative Approaches, 51 TAx L. REv. 725, 741
(1996).
96. Lee A. Sheppard, The Consumption Tax: Tax Protectionism, TAX NOTES
13, 15 (1995).
97. Id.
9& Id.
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billion. 99 A French water bottler sells 1 billion bottles of water to
the United States for $1 each. '00 The French bottler receives $1
billion.'l ' The federal government then taxes the United State

company a 25% federal income tax. '°2 The United States company
pays $250 million to the federal government and retains $750
million.0 3
Now suppose, the federal government decides to enact a 25%
destination based VAT.'04 The tax is imposed on water entering
the United States and rebated on all computers leaving the United
States.0 5 At first glance, it appears that the United States

computer company will receive an advantage over foreign
companies.'

6

However, a second look shows that water

companies will increase prices to $1.25, in order to offset the
consumption tax.

°7

Computers sold in the United States will

increase to $1,250 to offset the consumption tax. The general
price level in the United States will increase by 25%. The United
States computer manufacturer will still sell his computers for

$1,000 in France; however, when the $1 billion is spent in the U.S.
it will only purchase $750 million in goods (because of the 25%
price increase).' 8
For facility, the above example utilizes price; however, the

underlying dynamic is currency rates.'

9

Using the same analysis,

suppose the American computer manufacturer sold a computer
for $5,000 francs ($1,000 = 5,000 francs)."0 After the VAT, the

99.
100.

13, 15
101.
102103.
104.

Id.
Lee A. Sheppard, The Consumption Tax: Tax Protectionism,TAX NOTES

(1995).
Id.
Id.
Id.

LEE A. SHEPPARD, The Consumption Tax: Tax Protectionism, TAX
NOTES 13, 15 (1995).

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. To understand the concept of spending $1 billion while only purchasing
$750 million in goods, one must understand that the changing exchange rates
leads to a decrease in the value of the dollar. Thus, in period one an individual
may pay $1 dollar and receive $1 of real value in the form of goods or services.
Then, in period two, after the dollar has devalued, an individual will pay one
dollar but will receive less than $1 in real value. For more of an explanation on
this topic, see WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, ECONOMICS 163 (1997); Lee A.
Sheppard, supra note 97.

109.
110.

Lee A. Sheppard, supra note 104.
Id. at 14.
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exchange rate will adjust so that 5,000 francs are only worth $750
($750 = $5,000 francs)."' After the VAT, the franc is weaker than
the dollar.
Thus, when the computer manufacturer brings its
income back into the United States, the income will only buy $750
of goods (as compared to the $1,000 before the VAT). 3 "The
American bottled-water importer will be laying out the same
dollars for inventory-the4 exchange rate adjustment having
compensated for the tax."''
The preceding examples are very useful tools in examining
the effect on currency rates from a consumption tax. One
problem remains, throughout our analysis we assumed that the
price of the VAT may be passed onto the consumer. Here,
analysts assume that consumers will bear the VAT when all prices
are raised relative to each other. Only if wages increase in the
same amount, will the consumer bear all of the VAT. Economic
theory predicts that wages will rise in response to the increase in
the price of goods. "'
The above example is based upon destination principles;
however, the majority of economists believe the same will occur
under an origin based consumption tax." 6 Leading economist
Alan Auerbach and most economists agree." 7 One reason for
agreement is that foreign investment will be the same under both
destination and origination principles.
Under the origination
principle, investments abroad will receive a deduction."'
However, the deduction will be equal to the taxes paid on the
returns from investments abroad.'2 Thus, whether or not exports
are rebated (whether destination or origination tax is adopted) is

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Lee A. Sheppard, supra note 104.
114. Id.
115. Elasticity, price sensitivity, will not play a role in this analysis because
prices are rising as a whole. If some prices increased relative to others, then
elasticity of prices would be important. WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, ECONOMICS
394 (1997).
116. Lee A. Sheppard, supra note 104.
117. Louis Lyons, supra note 75.; Lee A. Sheppard, supra.note 104, at 167.
118. Lee A. Sheppard, supra note 104, at 15.
119. Alan Auerbach testimony in front of the Senate Finance Committee held
April, 1995 quoted in Lee A. Sheppard, supra.note 104, at 15.
120. Id.
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not of importance.' 2' Both types of consumption taxes will result
in the same level of foreign investment. As stated by Auerbach:
Though investments abroad receive a deduction, the tax
benefitof this deduction is equivalent in present value to the
taxes thatwill be paid in the future on the cash flows that the
As a result, it is not particularly
investmentgenerates.
important whetherforeign investments are made under and
origin-based ordestination-based value added tax. I3
Two treasury economists, Harry Grubert and T. Scott Newlon
support the proposition that origin based consumption taxes are
neutral. They state that an origin based tax is equivalent to a
destination based tax because both imports and exports must be
paid for in real dollars.' 24 "An origin-based tax amounts to the
prepayment of tax on U.S. investments abroad, because in real
terms foreign investment is financed by exports and return on
investment is in the form of imports."' 25
The crux of Grubert and Newlon's argument rests upon all
trade being paid for in real dollars; however, in practice, many
nations have a trade deficit. With a trade deficit, a nation is
putting payment of imported goods off into the future. When a
trade deficit occurs, exchange rates of the trading nations may not
adjust and the destination and origination based taxes will not be
and
neutral. In the next section, theories of the destination
26
origination consumption tax as non-neutral are advanced.1

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Alan Auerbach testimony in front of the Senate Finance Committee held
April, 1995 quoted in Lee A. Sheppard, supra. note 104, at 15.
124. Harry Grubert and T. Scott Newlon American Enterprise Institute
seminar in Washington on consumption taxes and the global economy held June
14, 1996 quoted in Louis Lyons, supra note 75, at 1735.
125. Id.
126. Before advancing, it should be noted that Some advocates of a VAT, use
the theory, that destination and origination consumption taxes are neutral, to
their benefit. The advocates of the VAT oppose the corporate income tax
because, in their words, it discriminates against imports. The discrimination
exists because exports cannot be rebated under GATT (General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade). They then argue in favor of a neutral system like the
consumption tax where exports can be rebated. For economists who believe
destination and origination consumption taxes are neutral, currency exchange
rates are the guiding force, the federal income tax is just as neutral as a
consumption tax. In addition, border rebates (on exports) may be fully
consistent with the GATT as long as they do not discriminate against imports or
provide over-rebates on exports. In theory there is no discrimination against
imports after a border adjustment; however, statistical evidence to support this
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Destinationand OriginationBased Consumption Taxes Are
Not Neutral

Economic theory holds that the effects of a destination based
system and an origination based system are equivalent if the
exchange rate and domestic price adjustments are taken into
account.'27 However, a destination based system and an origination based system are long run outcomes that depend upon
efficient financial institutions and flexible interest rates. Without
the flexibility, interest rates may not be able to neutralize the
effects on imports or exports. Those economists who do not trust
in the flexibility of exchange rates believe that destination and
origination based consumption taxes are not neutral.
Often exchange rates are not flexible. "In the short run,
prices and exchange rates are less than perfectly flexible, and a
change from one principle to another affects a country's competitive position in the real world.' ' 28 Under imperfectly flexible
exchange rates, there will, at best, be a time lag and, at worst, the
time will never arrive before the relative prices of goods is
restored. 129 Thus, analysts cannot rely on exchange rates to take
up the slack.
Second, tax policy is politically motivated and influenced by
special interest groups.' 0 "A general tax levied at a uniform rate
on all goods and services has no counterpart in the real world."''
Because of political pressure, different rates are applied to
different goods. Here, the choice of a border tax adjustment
scheme is imperative if the relative price levels that exist under a
comparative advantage system are to remain intact. 1 2 In addition,
other international inefficiencies may prevent the restoration of
relative prices.'33 For example, net transfer payments or capital
flows from one nation to another would disrupt the adjustment

theory is presently absent. Indeed, this evidence would be extremely difficult to
exact. Lee A. Sheppard, supra note 104, at 13.
127. Sijbren Cnossen, Coordination of Sales Taxes in Federal Countries and
Common Markets, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 741, 747 (1994).
12& Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Sijbren Cnossen, Coordination of Sales Taxes in Federal Countries and
Common Markets, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 741, 747 (1994).
132. Id.
133. Id.
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process.
Also,
uniform
rates,adjustments.
instituted by7 national
reserve banks,
could
preventexchange
the required
V.

Models for Nations Trading Under Consumption Tax
Systems

A destination or origination based consumption tax's
dynamics are difficult to control; however, the problem increases
exponentially when many separate nations are involved. To
predict the outcomes of trade between nations, I analyze the
results of trade between two independent nations. The nations
are paired according to the four possible outcomes that result
from our two types of consumption taxes.
In the following analysis, four models of international trade
between nations adopting either the destination or origination
consumption tax are presented. First, consider Nation 1 which
implements an origination tax and Nation 2 which implements a
destination tax. 3 6 A $150.00 good is produced in Nation 1. With a

15% consumption tax, the producer pays $22.50 in taxes. The
good is then 0 rated as it is imported into Nation 2.137 Once
received by Nation 2, $50.00 of value is added. Then the good is
sold with a consumption tax of 15%. The tax dollars received
equal $30.00. Of the $30.00, $22.50 is owed to Nation 1 and $7.50
belongs to Nation 2. The primary breakdown under this system is
that Nation 1 must rely on Nation 2 to reimburse the producer in
Nation 1 the $22.50. If reimbursement does not occur, the
producer in Nation 1 will be double taxed on the value it
produced.
The second model involves an origination based consumption
tax in Nation 1 and an origination based consumption tax in
Nation 2.138 Nation 1 produces a good valued at $150.00. Nation 1
collects taxes of $22.50. Nation 2 imports the good and adds
$50.00 of value. When sold, the good will be taxed 15% on the

134.
135.

Id.
Sijbren Cnossen, Coordination of Sales Taxes in Federal Countries and
Common Markets, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 741, 747 (1994).
136. Integrated Text Sixth VAT Directive (1992).
137. The importance of 0 rating is to safeguard the principles of a destination
based consumption tax. Exports are exempt. BEN TERRA & PETER WATFEL,
EUROPEAN TAX LAW 126 (1993).
138. Opposite of Integrated Text Sixth VAT Directive (1992). Currently,
there is no real world example of one origination based system trading with

another.

590

DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:3

$50.00 of added value. 3 9 Thus, Nation 2 will collect $7.50. Here
all value is captured in the country which produced the good.
In the third model, Nation 1 enacts a destination consumption
1
4
tax. 0 Nation 1 produces $150.00 of oods. The goods are then 0
rated and imported into Nation 2.14' Nation 2, an origination
based system, adds $50.00 of value to the good and sells it. The
origination tax in Nation 2 only taxes the $50.00 of added value;
therefore, the $150.00 of value is lost to both tax systems.
Model four shows a good flowing from one destination based
system to another. 4 1 In Nation 1 a good is produced worth
$150.00. The good is then imported, at a 0 rate, into Nation 2, also
a destination based system, and $50.00 of value is added.14 The
good is then sold for $200.00. At a consumption tax rate of 15%,
$30.00 is collected in tax.' 44 All $30.00 is kept by Nation 2's
government. Nation 1 loses all tax revenue to Nation 2.
The four models show international trade between nations
that can choose between destination or origination based
consumption taxes. The following sections use the four models,
and the international trading systems they represent, to predict the
effect of those systems on interjurisdictional equity, border
controls and multinational company location.
A. InterjurisdictionalEquity
The phrase interjurisdictional equity refers to the concept
that the country that produced the value should reap the tax
benefits. 4 1 If origination and destination based consumption taxes
are neutral, then each of our models should yield perfect
interjurisdictional equity. 46 However, if exchange rates are not

139. Opposite of Integrated Text Sixth VAT Directive (1992).
140. Integrated Text Sixth VAT Directive (1992).
141. The importance of 0 rating is to safeguard the principles of a destination
based consumption tax. Exports are exempt. BEN TERRA & PETER WATrEL,
supra note 137.
142. See Integrated Text Sixth VAT Directive, Art. 2 (1992).
143. BEN TERRA & PETER WATrEL, supra note 137.
144. Integrated Text Sixth VAT Directive, Art. 2 (1992).
145. There is also sentiment that interjurisdicational equity is not based upon
who produces the value but who consumed the goods.
Considering
interjurisdictional equity from the standpoint of the producer creates incentive
for governments to enhance production over consumption. Sijbring Cnossen,
supra note 128; Malcolm Gillis et al., Indirect Consumption Taxes: Common
Issues and Differences Among the Alternative Approaches, TAX L. REV., 725
(1996).
146. Sijbring Cnossen, supra note 127, at 745-6.

2000]

FRAMEWORK ON CONSUMPTION TAXES

flexible and adjustment does not take place properly, then

interjurisdicational equity will not be properly distributed during
international trade.147 In addition, in the short run, before
adjustment takes place, interjurisdictional equity will also not be
distributed properly. 14

To emphasize, unless exchange rates

adjust and financial institutions allow that adjustment, the
following will occur.

Utilizing model two explained above, when both nations
adopt an origination based consumption tax, Nation 1 and Nation
2 each receive the tax on the value that each created. 149 Hence,

there is perfect interjurisdictional equity.'50 To demonstrate,
Nation A received $22.50 in tax revenue on the $150.00 of value it
created, and Nation B received $7.50 in tax revenue on the $50.00
of revenue it created.'15
Under international trade between two destination based

nations, model four, Nation 1 is subject to the institutions and fair
trade practices of Nation 2. The sole tax collection occurs in
Nation 2. Thus, Nation 2 holds the entire $30.00 of the tax. If the
22.50 owed to Nation 1 is returned, then Nation 1 will receive the

tax on the value it created. However, and more likely then not,
Nation 2 will retain the whole $30.00 leaving Nation 1 to obtain
tax revenue through other means."'
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. All models only control for the type of consumption tax. The outcomes
are subject to change if different tax rates are imposes. For example, Consider
an origination based consumption tax in Nation A of 10% and in Nation B of
20%. When Nation A exports its goods to Nation B, A's cars will have already
have a 10% tax imposed by Nation A and B's cars will have the domestic 20%
tax rate imposed. The different tax rates may lead to B's cars being favored
because of their lower price.
Under a destination tax, the discrepancies in rates disappear. When Nation
A exports its goods into Nation B, A's autos will be charged a tax rate of 20%
and B's autos will be charged a tax rate of 20%. Under the framework presented
above, the destination based system unifies the tax rate charged to each of the
goods, from Nation A and Nation B; however, the 20% tax collected in Nation B
does not represent who created the value. Thus, the analysis of the type of
consumption tax is of utmost importance.
Malcolm Gillis et al., Indirect Consumption Taxes: Common Issues and
Differences Among the Alternative Approaches, TAX L. REV., 725 (1996);
Sijbring Cnossen, supra note 127.
150. Sijbring Cnossen, supra note 127, at 745-6.
151. Most likely, the proper procedure will involve Nation 2 receiving the
whole $30.00 tax subject to a $22.50 credit. See Integrated Text Sixth VAT
Directive (1992).
152. More than likely Nation 1 will also retain the whole tax revenue of
Nation 2's imports. However, interjurisdictional equity is only achieved when
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Model one, an origin system trading to a destination based
system, is of most detriment to the producers in Nation 1. Nation

2 will collect all of the revenue from the 20% tax. Note that the
tax on $150.00 of the value was previously collected in Nation 1.
Subjecting the good in Nation 1 to a 20% tax in Nation B, in fact,
taxes the producer in Nation A twice on the $150.00 value.
Double taxation is a severe burden on producers competing
globally.'53 To protect its producers, Nation 1 may strengthen its

position if it changes to a destination based policy. 4
In contrast, model three, a destination system trading to an
origin based system, allows the tax on the $150.00 of value to
escape taxation. The destination based system in Nation 1
exempts the export. Nation 2, with an origination based system,
taxes only the $50.00 in value added in Nation 2. Thus, Nation 2
collects $7.50 in tax revenue on the $50.00 in value, and no tax is
ever collected on the $150.00 produced in Nation 1.
The models demonstrate that where both nations have
origination based consumption taxes the nation that produced the
value receives the tax revenue. Thus, model two results in the best
distribution of interjurisdictional equity. However, in practice,
there are no examples of two nations with origination based
systems conducting international trade. The best explanation for
this phenomenon is the greed of nations to reap the most tax
revenues possible. 1 5 To increase tax revenues, nations switch to a
destination based system. 5 6 Once this occurs, the destination
based nation receives revenue on value they did not create.'57 In
addition, the other, origination based system, must switch to a
destination based system to protect its producers from double
taxation.' A tendency for each nation to change to a destination
based policy may explain why model four is the equilibrium point
for most of international trade. 9

there is a balance of trade. WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, ECONOMICS 163, 83
(1997).
153. DANIEL MITCHELL, supra note 31, at 34.
154. AVINASH DIXIT & BARRY NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY 74-6
(1991).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. AVINASH DIXIT & BARRY NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY 74-6

(1991).
159.

Id.
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B. Border Tax Adjustments
Usually imports and exports are freed from tax upon leaving
the taxing nation and are then subject to sales tax upon entering
the next taxing nation. These adjustments are called Aborder tax
adjustments."'" In practice, because most consumption taxes are
destination based, 16' border tax adjustments are a mechanism used
to implement destination based taxes.
Border tax adjustments are crucial in maintaining the tax
scheme set out in models three and four. In both situations, $150
of value is created and exempted as it is exported out of the
country. The exemption allows the tax to be levied at the
Adestination" where the good is consumed.
Border adjustments are also crucial in maintaining the
benefits of comparative advantage. 6 Tax policy dictates that
goods which can be produced at a lower price in one location
should retain that lower price status in other markets. Thus,
comparative advantage is an important concept. The cumulative
worth of all goods produced under a system maintaining the
comparative advantage of its producers will be greater than under
a system that does not.' 64 Border adjustments help to keep the
relative prices of goods the same in all markets in order to reap
the benefits of comparative advantage.
The importance of border tax adjustments is also contingent
upon whether one accepts the theory that destination and origination consumption taxes are neutral.165 If the tax is neutral, then
the institution of border tax adjustments is unnecessary. The free
floating exchange rates will adjust, leaving the dollar to vacillate to
the appropriate strength or weakness.
160. Border tax adjustments are prohibited in the United States and Canada.
A retail sales tax is preferred by the United States and Canada because it does
not require a border tax. "Problems arise with out-of-state purchases of taxable
goods, interstate mail order and other direct-marketing sales, and with border
sales." "To protect the revenue from the tax, U.S. states have to coordinate the
levy of their RST's through mutual assistance agreements." Stephen E. Shay &
Victoria P. Summers, supra note 67.
161. Stephen E. Shay & Victoria P. Summers, supra note 67.
162. Comparative advantage is the ability to produce something at a lower
opportunity cost than other producers face. WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, supra
note 116, at 748-50; see also Sijbring Cnossen, supra note 152.
163. WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, supra note 152, at 748-50; see also Sijbring
Cnossen, supra note 127.
164. WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, supra note 152, at 748-50; see also Sijbring
Cnossen, supra note 127.
165. See generally Sijbring Cnossen, supra note 127, at 747.
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However, even if destination and origination based consumption taxes are neutral, there are some practical reasons to institute
border tax adjustments. 166 First, there may be huge gains and
losses for investors who prefer stability. 67 The length of time and
the amount of the exchange rate adjustment is uncertain.
In that
period of time when the dollar devalues, there would be significant windfall gains and losses to foreign investors in the United
States and to American investors abroad.169 To avoid the possibly
devastating financial consequences for important investors and to
maintain stability in the United States and its financial institutions,
border adjustments could be used. 170 Once created, border adjustments would need to be maintained unless we chose to devalue
the dollar at some time in the future. 7 '
A second theory supporting border tax adjustments when
neutrality will result from origination or destination based tax,
only emerges when nations utilize nonuniform tax rates. 7 1 Under
a destination system with border tax adjustments, the relative
prices of domestically-produced and imported goods would
increase by the same amounts, and the nonuniform tax rates
would operate like a set of selective excise taxes on consumption
goods. 73 In comparison, under an origination system without
border tax adjustments, the exchange rate adjustment discussed
above would reflect the average rate of
taxation. The result would
17 4
taxes.
production
selective
of
set
a
be
Although somewhat complex, the above analysis demonstrates that, under nonuniform rates, the use of a border tax
adjustment results in distortions to consumption.175 In contrast,
176
not using border tax adjustments affects production decisions.
Economic theory, and capitalism, prefer to distort consumption
rather than production decisions. 177 One reason is that it is

166.
Malcolm Gillis et al., Indirect Consumption Taxes: Common Issues and
Differences Among the Alternative Approaches, 51 TAX L. REV. 725, 741 (1996).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 742-3.
169. Id.; see also LEE A. SHEPPARD, supra note 104.
170.
Malcolm Gillis, supra note 166, at 742-3.

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 743.
Id. at 743-4
Id.
Malcolm Gillis, supra note 166, at 743-4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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generally more efficient in the long run to distort consumption.'
A second reason is that politicians can use the resultant excise
taxes on consumption to promote their agendas.'79 For example,

the nonuniform rates can promote basic foods, like bread, over
goods that generate negative externalities, like tobacco.
C. Relocation of Corporations

A tax should not influence the decisions of corporations to
relocate."' However, multinational corporations will locate in the
country that affords them the lower tax rate and the easier
administrative process."' The dilemma of relocation is also based
upon whether destination and origination based taxes are indeed
neutral. Those who predict neutrality will result believe that
multinational corporations will not move off-shore. To prove
their hypothesis, Harry Grubert and T. Newlon, treasury economists, point to the increase in foreign corporate investment and
domestic investment that would result from a destination based
consumption tax."' Under a consumption tax, foreign corporate
investment in the United States should rise."' This is true even
though the U.S. tax on foreign income would be repealed under a
consumption tax. Grubert and Newlon state, A ... expensing of

deductible capital investment expenditures would cut the U.S. tax
on normal returns to investment to about the same degree as the
existing tax on returns to foreign investment."' l 4 In other words,
the tax on returns from investment would be the same no matter
the source, domestic or foreign, for the return.15
If destination and origination based consumption taxes are
not neutral, then whether a nation adopts a destination or origination tax may ultimately effect the location of multinational
companies. The best scenario for a multinational producer occurs

178. Malcolm Gillis, supra note 166, at 743-4.
179. Id.
180. Sijbring Cnossen, supra note 127, at 747.
181. Hall & Rabushka, supra note 1, at 32.
182. Harry Grubert and T. Scott Newlon American Enterprise Institute
seminar in Washinton on consumption taxes and the global economy held June
14, 1996 quoted in Louis Lyons, supra note 75, at 1735.
183. Louis Lyons, supra note 75.
184. Harry Grubert and T. Scott Newlon American Enterprise Institute
seminar in Washington on consumption taxes and the global economy held June
14, 1996 quoted in Louis Lyons, supra note 75, at 1735.
185. Id.
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in model three.1 6 Where the producer is under a destination
based system exporting to an origination based system, the
multinational producer escapes paying taxes on the $150.00 of
value it produces.
The worst situation occurs in model one. The multinational
producer is under an origination based policy exporting to a
destination based nation. The producer is subject to double
taxation on the value it produces. The double taxation leaves little
doubt that the multinational company will relocate to a destination based nation. The incentive to relocate supports the
conclusion
above that all nations must maintain interjurisdictional
87
equity.
Models two and four require the multinational corporation to
pay taxes on the value produced. The corporation is taxed equally
no matter if it is located in Nation 1 or Nation 2. In theory, model
four will also tax the multinational on value produced. However,
practice must require the tax collected at the time of sale to be
distributed back to Nation 1. One of the most convincing methods
of ensuring that companies receive their fair share of taxes is to
institute a VAT type of destination consumption tax. The VAT
makes it difficult to cheat because of its simplicity: a flat percentage is paid out of every transaction. The VAT is essentially
self-enforcing."' To demonstrate, under a VAT, each level of
production pays taxes on the value added to the product." 9
Therefore, every subsequent producer monitors the proceeding
producer 90 This ensures that the subsequent producer does not
pay tax on value they did not contribute. Enforcement continues
until the last transaction, that between the retailer and the
customer.191
Two safeguards exist against fraud by the retailer. The
penultimate transaction is recorded; therefore, the retailer has
only a limited ability to defraud. 92 Any attempt to report much
less than receipts received, will be caught by a watchful Internal

186. For simplicity sake, consider the multinational company as the producer
of the $150.00 value.
187. Sijbring Cnossen, supra note 127, at 745.
188. Kalyani Robbins, Implications of the Tax Reform Proposalsfor Fraud,
TAX NOTES, May 28, 1999 v83 i9, 1375, 1377.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Kalyani Robbins, Implications of the Tax Reform Proposalsfor Fraud,
TAX NOTES, May 28, 1999 v83 i9, 1375, 1377.
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Revenue Service. 93 Another safeguard flows from the division of

tax reporting among all levels of production.' 94 The retailer is only
one in a chain of reporting enterprises, and therefore, pays only a
small portion of the total tax. 9' Fraud is possible but only with
cooperation

among

companies within

a complete

line of

production.
VI. What Is Best for the European Union?
The European Union operates under a destination based
VAT system known as a deferred payment system. 96 Under this
approach, the compensatory import tax is not levied and imported
goods are not checked physically at the border. Instead, the credit

mechanism of the VAT is relied on to ensure that the first taxable
person in the importing country implicitly pays the compensatory
tax, since there is not offsetting credit. Deferred payment requires

that the importer report the compensatory import tax within 8
days after the importation of the goods. 97 By making the recipient
liable for the tax on the goods, the VAT is enforced.198
However, the European Union has long been contemplating

a change to an origination based tax. This may be a good idea. In
reviewing the four models, the best case scenario for inter-

jurisdictional equity, border adjustment, and business location
occurs when one origination based system trades with another
origination based system. But, it is also true that, in practice,

foreign trading partners do not adopt origination based taxes. It is
in the best interest of the European Union to utilize origination
based consumption taxes for intracommunity trading.

Because

the European Union can regulate trading with itself, it can realize
all the benefits of origination based consumption taxes without
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. The principle of the deferred payment scheme was adopted in Article 23
of the Sixth Directive of the European Commission. The Integrated Text of the
Sixth VAT Directive, Article 23 "Obligations in respect of imports" states: "As
regards imported goods, Member States shall lay down the detailed rules for the
making of the declarations and payments."
In particular, Member States may provide that the value added tax payable
on importation of goods by taxable persons or persons liable to tax or certain
categories of these two need not be paid at the time of importation, on condition
that the tax is mentioned as such in a return to be submitted under Article 22(4).
Integrated Text of the Sixth VAT Directive, Art. 23 (1992).
197. Sijbring Cnossen, supra note 127, at 750.
19& Id.
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having the strategic problem of a trading partner switching to a
destination based tax.
The European Union can then adopt a destination tax for
trade with foreign nations. This dual strategy enhances the
position of the European Union in global trade.
Only one obstacle may prohibit the adoption of a dual tax
policy: the GATT. Under the GATT 1994, international trade
practice cannot result in an export subsidy.19 Hence, the above
discussion on whether destination and origination based taxes are
neutral is the determining factor.2°° If the tax is found to function
as an export subsidy, it will be allowed under GATT 1994 only if it
meets two conditions.20 The first is that it must be one of several
"indirect" taxes set forth in the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures.20 ' The VAT tax that is proposed for
intracommunity trade is allowed. 2°' However, at present, no
origination based systems are mentioned. The second condition
provides that an export subsidy will only be allowed if the rebate
on the export does not exceed the amount levied on the goods
sold for domestic consumption0 Whether a dual tax policy will
favor exports over domestic goods sold will depend upon the tax
205
rates instituted under each system.
In conclusion, whether the dual tax policy is prohibited by
GATT balances on whether or not destination and origination
based consumption taxes are neutral. The comment presents both
views on the neutrality of consumption taxes and demonstrates
that flexible exchange rates are the determining factor.

199. "The products of the territory of the contracting party imported into the
territory of another contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly,
to internal taxes or other internal changes of any kind in excess of those applied
directly or indirectly to like domestic products." GATT art. 3, para. 2, of part II.
See also Stephen E. Shay & Victoria P. Summers, supra note 67; Within the
GATT, each member agreed to treat all member nations equally with respect to
trade. WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, supra note 152, at 763.
200. Stephen E. Shay & Victoria P. Summers, supra note 67, at 1048.

201.

Id.

202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Stephen E. Shay & Victoria P. Summers, supra note 67, at 1048.
205. In respect to the difference between a credit-invoice VAT and a
"subtractive-method" tax, "Adjustments could be made for inputs exempted or
taxed at different rates, but this would be extremely burdensome as each item of
tax paid would have to be tracked." Id. at 1051. The same is not true for a dual
tax system. Exports would be treated differently from domestic sales. Inputs
would not need to be tracked.
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In addition, the use of the four models of consumption tax in
international trade provides important options for nations with
developing tax policies. The four models distinguish possible
scenarios for interjurisdictional equity, border adjustments, and
company location. Thus, I concluded that the best option for the
European Community is an origin based consumption tax for
intracommunity trading and a destination based consumption tax
for international trading.
Jane L. Seigendall

